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Immediately after the announcement of the American election results, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin congratulated Donald Trump on his victory and expressed hope that the two 
countries’ bilateral relations could be brought out of the current crisis. For Russia, the polit-
ical situation in the United States is of crucial political importance, as in the perception of 
the Kremlin, the US is Russia’s strategic adversary. Despite their official declarations of neu-
trality, the Russian authorities clearly favoured Trump’s candidacy during the elections. This 
was linked to Moscow’s hopes for the following events: deepening tensions in trans-Atlantic 
relations, and with the United States’ other allies (including weakening of NATO); a partial re-
view of US policy in the security sphere (including drawing down US military engagement in 
Europe, including on NATO’s eastern flank); and in particular a possible strategic deal with 
Russia (based on the transactional approach seen in Trump’s policy statements, and his per-
ceived ‘pragmatism’ in relation to Russia). In recent months the Russian government has taken 
a series of active measures (aggressive actions and military demonstrations, cyber-attacks, 
leaks and media campaigns) whose objectives included compromising or weakening the camp 
or the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. In recent weeks, this was helped by Russia’s artificial 
aggravation of the crisis in relations with the United States. At the same time, Moscow has 
demonstrated its potential to cause harm, and is now attempting to force a new US adminis-
tration to enter a strategic bargain with it. 
Donald Trump’s victory in the elections significantly increases the likelihood that Russia will 
make a ‘tactical pause’: a break in, or limitations to, its aggressive actions against the United 
States, in order not to antagonise the president-elect and encourage him to review policy in 
Washington in a manner which benefits Russia. less likely, but still possible, is a scenario of 
Russia continuing, or (much less likely) even escalating, its aggressive actions until the end 
of outgoing President Barack Obama’s term (20 January 2017), by when Washington will have 
difficulty in responding to any action Moscow might take. 
The importance of the US elections 
for Russia 
The presidential elections in the United States 
are of great importance for Russia. In the polit-
ical system of the United States, the President 
has a decisive role in determining foreign and 
security policy, foreign economic policy, and the 
defence of the nation. The ruling Russian elite 
sees the US as a strategic enemy, and a source 
of existential challenges for Russia. This is due to 
their belief that the United States is conducting 
a deliberate and systematic policy of crowding 
Russia out from its ‘natural sphere of influence’, 
weakening the Russian Federation (by external 
pressures and internal sabotage), and seeking 
to change the Russian political regime. In this 
way, US policy is generally seen as a personal 
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threat to the security of the Russian ruling elite. 
The US is also treated as the main obstacle to 
the implementation of the Kremlin’s work of re-
constructing the great-power status of Russia 
and expanding its influence abroad. 
Russia’s strategic interests regarding 
the United States and its administration
For these reasons, one of the strategic objectives 
of Russian foreign and security policy is (both in-
dependently and in tactical coalition with other 
countries, such as China) to weaken the interna-
tional influence of the US. Many of Russia’s ac-
tions in this sphere (including its activities in Lat-
in America, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific 
region, and partly also in Europe) are elements 
of Russia’s global anti-American policy. More-
over, the Russian military involvement in Syria, 
and even to some extent the war in Ukraine, 
are in a certain way proxy wars with the US.
On the other hand, the constant goal of Russian 
foreign policy since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union has been the attempt to come to a stra-
tegic deal with the United States. In Moscow’s 
eyes, such a deal should apparently be based 
on the following concepts:
• the recognition (formal or informal) of the 
Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet 
area (with the temporary exclusion of the Bal-
tic states); 
• the US refraining from making geostrate-
gic changes to the status quo by relocating 
troops and military installations in regions di-
rectly adjacent to Russia (especially in Central 
Europe, which would here imply the de facto 
creation of a buffer zone in kind); 
• the recognition by the United States of Rus-
sia’s position as a global power, and of its 
important foreign interests (which in prac-
tice amounts to cooperation with Russia, and 
consultation with it on important global and 
regional security issues). 
The failure of previous attempts to strike the 
deal described above has led Moscow to sys-
tematically heighten tensions in its policy to-
wards the United States (after what are usu-
ally brief periods of a more pragmatic policy 
course).
It is therefore in Russia’s interest that the US 
administration should on the one hand be 
quite weak, focused on domestic issues, limit-
ing its foreign policy activity, and experiencing 
increasing problems in its relations with its al-
lies; while on the other hand, it should be ready 
for dialogue with Russia, and open to making 
a strategic deal with Moscow and recognising 
important Russian interests. 
Russia on the United States 
during the election campaign
Despite public declarations by the authorities of 
the Russian Federation on their country’s neutrali-
ty regarding the candidates in the US presidential 
elections (such was the tone adopted on sever-
al occasions by President Putin and his spokes-
man Dmitri Peskov), Moscow was clearly betting 
on Donald Trump. This was for several reasons. 
Firstly, Russian experts and politicians perceived 
the success of Trump in the Republican Party 
primaries and the election campaign as a symp-
tom of the political crisis in the United States. 
In their eyes, he represents a rebellion by large 
groups of US citizens against the political es-
tablishment and political correctness in the 
liberal-dominated traditional media. Trump’s 
success is also a signal of a rise in isolationist 
sentiments, in xenophobia (fear of ‘foreigners’, 
especially Muslims), and a reluctance to pursue 
an active foreign policy (especially in the spirit 
of the liberal/conservative interventionism of 
the Clinton and Bush Jr eras). The deep polar-
isation of public opinion in the US and the rise 
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of internal tensions (which will not disappear, 
and may even become more severe after the 
elections) are clearly seen in Russia as an oppor-
tunity to weaken the US domestically, a weak-
ness which will likely be expressed as a reduced 
capacity and will to engage internationally, 
opening the field for Russia to be more active. 
Secondly, the rhetoric of Trump and some of his 
colleagues during the election campaign (refer-
ring among other things to a certain diminu-
tion of NATO’s role and making the Alliance’s 
support conditional on financial contributions 
from its allies; the announcement of a desire 
to renegotiate or abandon important trade 
agreements such as NAFTA, TTP or TTIP, etc.) 
raised concerns and (albeit not always publicly 
expressed) disapproval among both the publics 
and the ruling elites (or parts thereof) of many 
US allies, both in Europe and Asia. Such rhet-
oric, however, was received with joy and hope 
in Moscow, as it increased the probability that 
relations between the United States and its al-
lies (including trans-Atlantic relations) would 
become tenser. This could also negatively affect 
the coherence, activity and agency of NATO 
(which Russia sees as a strategic enemy, an in-
strument of American policy and a tool of US 
hegemony in Europe in the security sphere). 
Thirdly, both Trump’s past business involve-
ment and the rhetoric he and some of his as-
sociates have used (including positive opinions 
about Vladimir Putin as leader, his declarations 
of readiness to ‘negotiate’ with Russia, talking 
about the need for cooperation with Moscow 
against ‘Islamic State’, his downplaying and 
partial justification of Russia’s aggressive policy 
towards Ukraine and the Baltic States, etc.) sug-
gest his ‘pragmatic’ and transactional approach 
to Russia. This has, in the eyes of the Kremlin, 
created an opportunity for dialogue with Trump 
as President, which could (at least in part) lead 
to some kind of strategic bargain and the rec-
ognition of some of Russia’s important interests 
(for example, in the post-Soviet sphere). 
At the same time, Russia may not be sure what 
the specific direction of US policy will be under 
a possible Trump presidency. From Moscow’s 
viewpoint, there is a risk that its aggressive ac-
tions will meet with a stark response from Trump 
(partly for reasons of image), which will bring 
the risk of undermining Russia’s great-power 
image promoted by its own propaganda.
In turn, the candidature of Hillary Clinton, de-
spite occasional declarations by her or her 
colleagues about the need for a pragmatic 
dialogue with Russia, was seen in Moscow as 
a scenario which carried more potential risks 
than opportunities. This resulted, among other 
things, from the Russian ruling group and Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin’s extreme distrust of and 
resentment towards Hillary Clinton, stemming 
especially from her association with US support 
for the potential candidacy of Dmitri Medvedev 
for a second presidential term (which did not 
happen) and the subsequent protests in Rus-
sia (from December 2011 to December 2012; 
Putin bluntly accused the then US Secretary of 
State of instigating and managing these pro-
tests, which were seen in the Kremlin as an 
American act of political sabotage aimed at 
regime change in Russia, i.e. another attempt 
at a ‘colour revolution’). Clinton is also partially 
identified with the policy of her husband Bill 
Clinton (who was US President from 1993 to 
2001), who is perceived today in the Kremlin as 
essentially anti-Russian (in the light of NATO’s 
enlargement eastwards, the NATO aerial bom-
bardments in Bosnia & Herzegovina and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, among other 
reasons). This negative image does not com-
pensate for Clinton’s involvement as Secretary 
of State (2009-2013) in the ‘reset with Russia’ 
policy (since 2009), of which, however, she was 
neither the initiator (formally, Vice-President 
The candidature of Hillary Clinton was 
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carried more potential risks than oppor-
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Joe Biden) nor the main executor (the key deci-
sions were taken personally by President Oba-
ma). Finally, the Kremlin must have realised that 
the conviction of Democratic Party elites that 
Russia was conducting hostile sabotage against 
the party and Clinton’s candidacy (especially 
in the form of cyber-attacks and media leaks) 
would have been a strong stimulus to a possi-
ble Clinton administration to take some (albeit 
limited) political retaliation against Russia and 
the Kremlin. 
Russia’s actions on behalf of Trump 
For these reasons, during the US election cam-
paign Russia took a number of explicit and 
implicit actions in de facto support of Donald 
Trump’s nomination. With regard to explicit ac-
tions, Russia sought above all to demonstrate 
the ineffectiveness of US foreign policy as pur-
sued by the Democratic administration of Ba-
rack Obama (part of which was implemented 
by Hillary Clinton), especially regarding Syria. 
Moscow first sought to create the illusion that 
there could be limited cooperation with the US 
on Syria, at the cost of making further ceasefire 
agreements to increase its actual impact on the 
situation, just so that it could provoke a formal 
break in this cooperation in October 2016 in 
the aftermath of its attack on a UN humanitar-
ian convoy and massive air strikes on Aleppo. 
In addition, Russia demonstratively increased 
its military presence in Syria (by sending out 
more anti-missile systems – this time S-300s – 
and an aircraft carrier). 
In October, Russia suspended its participation 
in the Russian-American agreement on the 
disposal of plutonium. The bill signed by Presi-
dent Putin contained a list of conditions under 
which Moscow was prepared to resume imple-
mentation of the agreement (these included 
the abolition of all US sanctions against Russia 
and compensation for the financial losses aris-
ing from them, as well as the withdrawal of US 
troops and military infrastructure from Central 
and Eastern Europe to the state of deployment 
as of the year 2000). These unrealistic requests 
in fact had the following aims: 
1. to demonstrate the profound scale of the 
crisis in Russian-American relations, and put 
the blame for this on the Democratic Obama 
administration;
2. to submit inflated requests as a prelude to 
future negotiations on conditions for the 
normalisation of relations with the new US 
administration (after the new President is 
sworn in on 20 January 2017);
3. to use this demonstration of assertiveness 
towards the US to improve the image and 
strengthen the legitimacy of President Putin, 
against the background of the anti-American 
sentiments of most of the Russian public. 
Apart from this, Russia has steadily ratcheted 
up tensions (particularly in autumn 2016) in 
its policy towards the armed forces of the US 
and its European allies and the US’ partners in 
Europe, by making a large number of (mostly 
military) provocations (subversive activities, vi-
olations of airspaceor provocative near-border 
overflights; combat aircraft approaching dan-
gerously close to aircraft and ships; large-scale 
and/or provocative military exercises; deploying 
offensive weapons; tests of strategic nuclear 
weapons, etc.) carried out in the Arctic, the Bal-
tic Sea, the Black Sea and the Western Balkans, 
among other areas. 
In the wake of this, the aggressiveness of Rus-
sian state propaganda directed against the US 
and its allies has increased. Even in October 
a kind of ‘psy-op’ (psychological operation) 
was carried out through state-controlled Rus-
sian media (both traditional and new), implying 
During the US election campaign Russia 
took a number of explicit and implicit 
actions in de facto support of Donald 
Trump’s nomination.
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that Russia was preparing for war (even at the 
nuclear level) with the US and NATO.
Finally, the Russian state-controlled media reg-
ularly criticised Hillary Clinton and Barack Oba-
ma, and spread (dis)information suggesting ir-
regularities in the functioning of the American 
electoral system, as well as the political crisis in 
the US against the background of the presiden-
tial elections; and reports about Donald Trump 
were usually presented in ironic, neutral or even 
moderately sympathetic tones. This was reflect-
ed in the results of Russian public opinion polls 
concerning the US presidential elections.
In October 2016 the WCIOM poll found that 
57% of respondents regarded the elections as 
important to Russia; an improvement in rela-
tions between Russia and the US was forecast 
by 29% of respondents if Trump won, but only 
4% in the case of Clinton; meanwhile 8% and 
45% of respondents respectively forecast wors-
ening relations. In turn, a survey by the inde-
pendent Levada Centre reported 41% support 
for Trump and 10% for Clinton among those 
interested in US elections. 
As for the partially implicit actions, in June 2016 
Russian hackers broke into and stole sensitive 
information and data from the computers of 
the Democratic Party’s electoral committee. 
The perpetrator of the attacks was most like-
ly the hacking groups apt28/Sofacy/FancyBear 
and apt29/CozyBear, which according to the US 
government (an official joint statement on the 
matter was issued in October by the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence) are sup-
ported by the authorities and special services of 
Russia. According to the media, in August 2016 
the same groups tried to attack the computer 
systems of electoral commissions in about half 
the states in the US. The above-mentioned in-
formation (including emails from Hillary Clinton 
herself or from her close associates) contain-
ing sensitive and/or compromising information 
was uploaded online from August to October, 
including on the homepages of WikiLeaks and 
DCLeaks (which have been acting in accordance 
with the political interests of Russia) and the 
alleged hacker Guccifer 2.0. Although Moscow 
has officially distanced itself from these activ-
ities, their attention-grabbing nature, as well 
as certain errors that enabled a partial identifi-
cation of the attack sources, may suggest that 
the Kremlin was in fact interested in casting re-
sponsibility onto the Russian government.
It seems that all of the above-mentioned ag-
gressive actions by Russia were intended 
not only to support the candidacy of Donald 
Trump in the elections, but also more broad-
ly to demonstrate Russia’s determination to 
use more and more offensive tools to achieve 
its political objectives, as well as Russia’s sig-
nificant ability (corresponding to its image as 
a great power) to cause potentially serious dam-
age to states which in Moscow’s assessment 
are pursuing anti-Russian policies (such as the 
US). This was probably intended to manipulate 
the new American administration (regardless of 
who is elected President) to take Russia serious-
ly and enter into dialogue with it on strategic 
interests. 
Russia’s possible tactics towards the US 
during the post-election period
Taking into account the objectives of Russian 
policy, and the experience of its course up 
to this point, we may generally predict two 
models of Russia’s behaviour in the post-elec-
tion period, following Donald Trump’s win in 
the elections.
Hopes of a revision of policy toward Rus-
sia and towards US’ allies by the new US 
administration could well prompt Mos-
cow to send signals of readiness to hold 
pragmatic talks, and avoid antagonising 
the new administration.
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1. The tactical pause (the most likely scenario)
Russia may temporarily suspend or limit its ag-
gressive actions against the US (and possibly 
US allies) pending the swearing-in of the new-
ly-elected President (20 January 2017), or until 
the formation of a new administration and its 
first declarations and decisions (to mid-2017). 
Hopes of a revision of policy toward Russia by 
the US and its allies could well prompt Moscow 
to send signals of readiness to hold pragmatic 
talks (such signals have been in fact already con-
veyed), and avoid antagonising the new admin-
istration (which otherwise could discourage such 
a policy revision). This scenario is supported by 
the fact that this summer and autumn (especially 
in October) Russia has demonstrated its poten-
tial to do damage, and the further escalation of 
such aggressive actions would increase the risk 
of potentially dangerous incidents, and/or the 
critical hardening of US policy towards Russia, 
also under the new administration.
2. The continuation/escalation of aggressive 
actions (the possible, but clearly less likely 
scenario)
Russia may continue or even exacerbate the ag-
gressive actions it has already implemented (cy-
ber-attacks, attempts at political sabotage, pro-
vocative action/military demonstrations, etc.) in 
one or more of the regions and countries in which 
these have already taken place (in Syria, Ukraine, 
the Baltic Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, etc.). 
This scenario is supported by the fact that before 
Donald Trump is sworn in as President (20 Janu-
ary 2017), the US will still be run by the Demo-
cratic Obama administration (which is the object 
of political attacks by both Trump and the Rus-
sian government). In this situation, the Kremlin 
may feel encouraged to further demonstrate the 
weakness of this administration, the more so as 
it will not really be willing and able to retaliate 
against Russia. 
An additional incentive is that some of Moscow’s 
specific policy objectives (such as an attempt to 
halt implementation of the decisions of NATO’s 
Warsaw summit, and the US decision to rein-
force the so-called eastern flank of the Alliance) 
would need to be carried out in a hurry (their 
implementation is provided for between Febru-
ary and April 2017), which would incline Moscow 
to raise the pressure in the run-up period. 
In each of the scenarios outlined above, we 
should expect pressure from Russia to cancel, 
delay or dilute the decisions of NATO and the 
United States regarding the reinforcement of 
NATO’s eastern flank. However, Moscow’s pri-
ority will be to deal with the question of the 
US-NATO anti-missile shield in Central Europe, 
especially the construction of the installations 
in Redzikowo (Poland). Russia will regard block-
ing this project as a priority short-term objective 
in its relations with the United States. 
